Russia, Georgia and Ukraine

Today I was fortunate to have lunch with several former State Department colleagues.  All of us share an interest in Russian affairs, and most of us once served in Moscow. A few of us represent, in terms of our experience, the "near abroad" and the Russian sphere of influence.

Dacor House

One of our group had just returned from a visit to Kiev, Tblisi, and Moscow. He was good enough to share his impressions and anecdotes from meetings with leading officials.  Given his level, and the level of people in his delegation (who included former Secretaries of State), they were able to talk to senior officials as well as the intelligentsia.

The overwhelming impression I am left with about these three countries is one of no purpose, no direction.

In all three countries the political elite seem to be undirected, with out goals or objectives.  I won't go in to it in depth here, but the silly politics of Kiev,  where the conviction of Tymoshenko, a key political opponent of President Viktor Yanukovich, has soured Ukraine's ties with the European Union, is but one example.  The EU sees the ruling as an example of "selective justice." My friend sees it as simply a waste of time and energy, accomplishing nothing. 

Georgia

In Georgia, constitutional changes approved in 2011 mean the prime minister will gain additional powers to rival those of the president. No longer tasked primarily with economic matters, the prime minister will have the power to name Cabinet members, including the ministers of the interior and defence, and to shape policies. The president, however, will remain commander in chief. The changes go into effect after the January presidential election. Saakashvili is not eligible to run and he has not yet said what he plans to do when he leaves the presidency. He has not excluded becoming prime minister. Saakashvili has brought the former Soviet republic closer to the West, with aims of one day joining NATO and the European Union, and he wants to be seen and remembered as a democratic reformer.

In the end, it's another country with no direction and no goals.  The political class is simply bent on keeping itself in office.

Our longest discussion had to do with Russia, Putin, and Syria.  There was a general consensus that Russia and Putin lack a sense of direction.  (So does Washington.) Everyone in Moscow worries about control, but it is not clear what they want the control to accomplish. The Russians have invested a lot of people, time and money in Syria, and now they see their investment going south.  It is not so much that they like Assad, but they don't like the alternatives.  (Neither do we.)

There was comment that we don't do much better -- we don't like Assad, but we don't have a good alternative to support either. We don't even know the leaders of the opposition.

I suggested that the time when it is hardest to control a canoe is when you are not paddling, when you have no destination in mind. 

If you are not paddling and moving forward, you are at the mercy of the winds and the currents.  It seems to me this is the weakness of current American policy. I understand -- Obama does not want to make a mistake that could become a political liability, especially during the election season.  But, the conscious absence of a policy is the worst possible solution.  We don't have to back a faction, we could back an outcome.

The Russians, for their part, are backing Obama in the election. The embassy in Washington won't even talk with the Republicans on the Hill -- not even about the Magitsky bill. And, that's a mistake.

The controversial Magnitsky Bill—a piece of legislation that Moscow considers to be explicit interference in the internal affairs of the country, would penalize and bar from the U.S. a number of Russian officials involved in the persecution and death of democratic activist Sergei Magnitsky. Magnitsky discovered and exposed some criminal behavior by some of Putin's allies -- he died in prison soon thereafter, under less than ideal circumstances.

Sergei Magnitsky

It is quite likely the Magnitsky bill will be passed next week by both houses of Congress, perhaps in conjunction with lifting the Jackson-Vanick restrictions. The Russians will retaliate. Look for things to get nasty. The month of August is always a time for nasty surprises (e.g., World War I, the German invasion of Poland, etc.)

Putin's support for Assad in Syria probably has more to do with his (Putin's) world  view and self image than anything else.  First, there is the simple anti-American element.  If the U.S. is against Assad, the Russia must support him.Putin grew up in an age of super power contest, and his instinct is to distrust and oppose the U.S. on any and every issue.

Second, is the picture in his head.  I once had a vet who said there are two kinds of dogs in the world.  One kind of dog is constantly looking at everything and comparing it to a pork chop.  If he can eat it, good.  If he can't, well let's move on.

The other kind of dog looks at everything and compares it to his mental image of a park.  Can I run in  it?  If not, I'm not interested and I'll keep going and continue looking for a park.

Putin is the same way, but his mental image is of the Tsar and Tsarist Russia.  If events and options look like they would favor the re-creation of Tsarist Russia, then he is for them.  If a solution leads away from that image of Russian greatness and power, then he is against it.  For Putin, it is a bi-polar world -- events and people are either helpful to the restoration of Russian greatness, or they are not and must be opposed.