April 17, 2014
by Ian Bond, Brian Carlson, Denis Corboy, William Courtney, John Herbst, Richard Kauzlarich, Ints Silins, William Taylor,
and Kenneth Yalowitz
Moscow's aggression against Ukraine has spawned not only an
international crisis, but fears throughout Russia's neighborhood. Even
countries that cooperate closely with Russia worry they could be next in line
for creeping annexation. No former Soviet country endorsed “independence“ of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, and the lack of
support for Moscow's annexation of Crimea is striking. Those former Soviet
neighbors that lag in economic development or freedoms are more vulnerable. The
West should help those willing to help themselves.
The seizure of Crimea on fabricated pretenses of threats to ethnic
Russians and the most recent provocations in eastern Ukraine by Russian forces
and proxies have sent shock waves from the Baltic states to Central Asia. Kyiv
has initiated an “anti-terror” security response in the Donetsk region. Even as
the outcome of the current crisis in Ukraine remains uncertain, it and the
other former Soviet countries are looking at what more they can do to steel
themselves against Russian coercion.
Ukraine
In some ways, Crimea was special. Russia has major strategic
interests because its Black Sea fleet resides there. Despite a treaty giving it
basing rights until 2042, Moscow could not be sure a future Ukrainian
government would not seek the fleet’s ouster. Nearly three-fifths of Crimea’s population,
or 1.5 million people, are ethnic Russians.
On the other hand, even the relatively pro-Western Yushchenko
government, in power from 2005 to 2010, did not jeopardize the Black Sea
fleet’s basing rights. Ethnic Russians living in Crimea, as in other areas of
Ukraine, have faced no systematic threats or violence before or after President
Yanukovych fled his office in February.
The remainder of Ukraine has nearly 7 million ethnic Russians,
most of whom reside in the eastern regions, where they are minorities. Ethnic
Russians make up only two-fifths of the population in the eastern regions of
Luhansk and Donetsk, one-fourth in Kharkiv and Zaporizhya, and one-fifth in
Odessa. Elsewhere they are less than one-fifth of the population (in the Kyiv
region only 6 percent, and less than 5 percent in every western region). Ethnic
tension in Ukraine has been almost nonexistent. Most people are bilingual, and
many, whose mother tongue is Russian, identify themselves as Ukrainians.
Ukraine’s problems, apart from Russia’s current interference, stem
from a lack of economic reform, extraordinary corruption, and the resulting
poverty. According to World Bank data for 2012, based on purchasing power
parity, Ukraine’s income per person is $7,180, only a third of Russia’s
$22,720. In the World Bank’s ease of doing business index for 2013, Ukraine
ranks 112 out of 189 countries; and in Transparency International’s corruption
perceptions index for 2013, Ukraine is 144 out of 175 countries. Both indices
rank Ukraine as even worse than Russia.
Last month, Ukraine’s parliament passed a set of tough economic
reforms, long sought by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for its
support. Some essential steps, such as slashing natural gas subsidies, will
create public unease. Russia is increasing the pressure by raising gas prices
to Ukraine and demanding payment for overdue bills. In the current emergency,
Ukrainians may realize they have no other choice, but the odds remain slim for
reform of an economy suffocated by corruption and Soviet-style regulation.
Ukraine now understands the risks of not having an effective
territorial defense that can raise the cost to Russia of aggression, but a
wealthier economy will be required for a major change in defense posture. Ukraine
must also develop reliable law enforcement and security services; the current
ones are corrupt and penetrated by Russia.
Ukraine’s democratic credentials are stronger. Its media is mostly
free and it has achieved several free and fair national elections and peaceful
turnovers of power. These gains bolster national unity. Successful presidential
elections next month, and the devolution of more power to elected officials in
regions and localities, will strengthen governmental legitimacy. Moscow’s effort
to intimidate Ukraine into creating a radically decentralized political system,
misnamed “federalism,” would leave the country unstable and vulnerable to
Russian interference. Ukraine should advance its parliamentary elections, now
set for 2017. Russian aggression has begun to unite Ukrainians in ways not seen
before.
Russia’s provocateurs in eastern Ukraine have so far been unable
to mobilize wide, pro-Russian support there. Ukrainian authorities have done
little better. People there are disillusioned after two decades of governments
that have failed to improve governance or create prosperity for any but a small
group of oligarchs. A wealthier economy based on the rule of law is essential
for building popular support and funding an effective defense. That retirees in
Crimea exult that their pensions will double under Russian rule shows how
poverty can erode national loyalty. That Ukraine’s military capabilities suffer
from low funding shows how poverty can also weaken a country’s defense posture.
Central Asia
Kazakhstan is next up in the number of ethnic Russians, with some
3.5 million. Nearly a quarter of the population is ethnic Slav, mostly located
close to the long border with Russia. The fraction was higher in Soviet times,
but Kazakhstan has spurred immigration northward of ethnic Kazakhs, and it
moved its capital to the north-central part of the country. Many ethnic
Russians have emigrated over the last two decades, but a measure of prosperity
has helped stem the outflow. Gross national income per person in Kazakhstan is
$11,790, about half the Russian level. Kazakhstan is 140 on the Transparency
index, almost as bad as Ukraine.
Kazakhstan’s leadership has fostered ethnic tolerance, although
most of the political power lies in ethnic-Kazakh hands. Authoritarian rule and
tight limits on media freedom heighten risks of political or social explosions.
If Moscow were to turn its propaganda fire on Kazakhstan, the results could be
unpredictable; closed politics suppress warning signs of problems.
With its large ethnic-Russian population, Kazakhstan may be the
country most vulnerable to Kremlin aggression allegedly aimed at “protecting
compatriots”. President Nursultan Nazarbayev shows sensitivity to Moscow’s
initiatives that do not unduly impinge on Kazakhstan. It belongs to Putin’s
favored Eurasian Customs Union, despite the higher external tariff wall, which
raises prices of automobiles and other imports from outside the union, stirring
popular resentment in Kazakhstan.
Russian actions in Crimea will cause Kazakhstan to be more careful
with Moscow, but Nazarbayev will quietly seek to buttress his country’s
security posture. Loyalty and military strength in Kazakhstan benefit from its
relative wealth, but are weakened by politics that are closed and discriminate
against ethnic Russians.
Uzbekistan, with some 1.5 million Russians, just over 5 percent of
the population, has widespread poverty and strict authoritarian rule, but is
less vulnerable because it does not share a border with Russia and its economy
is less tied to Russia’s. Always leery of Moscow’s intentions, President Islam
Karimov viewed the seizure of Crimea with disapproval. Long ago he weeded out
ethnic Russians from the military and security services, protecting himself
from Moscow’s mischief. Now, Karimov will look with greater skepticism at
Russia’s military presence in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Any
increase could be grounds for alarm in Uzbekistan. Its closed politics make its
large Tajik minority an unpredictable factor if the country were to come under
greater external pressure or a popular revolt were to occur.
Russia’s new aggression might have the least impact on Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia has a growing air force base in Kyrgyzstan,
and Russia has an army division and a large contingent of border guards in
Tajikistan. Hundreds of thousands of migrants from the two countries work in
Russia, often illegally. Their remittances make up large fractions of the
national income of both countries. Both grindingly poor, neither is in a
position to challenge Moscow. Turkmenistan has cool relations with Russia,
which has long sought to dominate the export of Turkmenistan’s natural gas
while offering low prices for it.
Russia has intimated that it could use naval power in the Caspian
Sea to impede transport of Kazakh and Turkmen energy to the South Caucasus and
world markets. A greater threat to Kazakhstan is that Russia could hamper the
export of its oil through the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. In recent
years Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have begun to export energy via pipeline to
China, bypassing Russia. Efforts to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan
across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan have foundered on their disputes over
delimitation of borders within the Sea.
Belarus and Moldova
Of the former Soviet countries, Belarus has one of the least
developed national identities and it shares a border with Russia. Most
Belarusians speak Russian, and Russian influence is strong through economic linkages
and energy subsidies that largely keep the unreformed economic system above
water. In security terms, Belarus is one of Russia’s only allies. For all his
talk of closer ties with Moscow, President Alexander Lukashenko does not want
Belarus to be submerged within Russia. He has staked out a nuanced position on
Crimea offering to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.
The crisis in Ukraine will have repercussions on Moldova and the
Transnistria separatist conflict there. Transnistria’s population is evenly
balanced between ethnic Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians, but the government
depends on Russia. Moscow supplies its forces and allies in Transnistria via a
land bridge across Ukraine. One Kremlin goal if it invades eastern and southern
Ukraine will be to secure Russia’s position in Transnistria. Separatist calls
there for annexation by Russia might influence Kremlin calculations. Moscow
claims that Ukraine and Moldova are “blockading” Transnistria, but the European
Union, which has an assistance mission there, denies this.
Moldova is also vulnerable to Russian coercion in Gagauzia, a
district populated by a Russified Turkic minority. Gagauzia held an illegal
referendum in February in which it voted heavily in favor of joining the
Eurasian Customs Union and of seceding from Moldova if Moldova “gave up its
independence” (a reference to joining the EU).
The South Caucasus
The three South Caucasus countries do not have large Russian
minorities but most of their peoples, especially adults, speak Russian. Relations
with Russia differ considerably. Armenia has a military pact with Russia. Under
pressure it has agreed to join the Eurasian customs union, reluctantly spurning
a possible Association agreement with the EU.
Azerbaijan, the wealthiest of the three due to energy exports, has
stayed out of military and economic unions with Moscow. It engages the EU only
on a limited basis due to its poor record of democracy and respect for human
rights. Azerbaijan’s major concern with Moscow is to keep it from interfering
with its energy exports outside of Russian pipelines. Azerbaijan is adept at
balancing ties with the West and Russia. It may be vulnerable to the growing
Islamist insurgency in the Russian republic of Dagestan, on Azerbaijan’s
northern border.
Russian troops have occupied the separatist enclaves of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia since the 2008 war, and are encroaching further
by constructing barbed-wire fences in Georgia beyond South Ossetia. Moscow
bitterly opposes Georgia’s quest for NATO membership and aims to prevent
Georgia from signing trade and partnership accords with the EU. Georgia has
held democratic parliamentary and presidential elections and undergone peaceful
transfers of political power.
Oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan across Georgia make it less
dependent on Russian resources than are many European countries. Georgia will
come under greater Russian pressure not to continue its westward course if
Ukraine falls under Moscow’s sway. Russia is trying to find other ways to entice
Georgia, such as through relations between the church hierarchies of the
two overwhelmingly Orthodox states.
The Baltic States
The Baltic states, members of NATO and the EU, have Western
backing and security assurances that are the envy of Russia’s other neighbors.
Yet even the Baltics are concerned. In Estonia, only a quarter of the
population is ethnic Russian. However, in the Estonian region of Narva
(bordering Russia), nearly 90 percent of the 60,000 residents are ethnic
Russian. Narva residents prefer Estonia, where conditions are better, but if
Russian troops were to occupy the region they might change some Estonians’
minds (as happened in Crimea, where prior to Moscow’s propaganda onslaught and
invasion most ethnic Russian residents preferred to remain in Ukraine).
In Latvia, ethnic Russians make up just over a quarter of the
population, but they are more evenly distributed, geographically, and better
integrated into politics and society. Most have no interest in joining Putin’s
Russia. Some have family roots in Latvia that go back centuries. Others settled
there during the Soviet era. About 300,000 people, or 14 percent of the
population, mostly ethnic Russians, are “noncitizens.” They are often
economically marginalized and politically alienated. Latvians make up less than
20 percent of the population of Latvia’s second-largest city, Daugavpils, in
the southeastern corner of the country.
While Moscow-directed disinformation claims otherwise, most ethnic
Russians in the Baltic states—especially the 18-35-year-old demographic—are
generally pro-Europe and proud of their respective countries.
Western Responses
This is not yet a new Cold War, but Russia’s rising threat to the
post–Cold War security order raises serious concerns about the Kremlin’s imperial
designs. Russia’s neighbors are not just faraway places. The Crimean crisis has
energized debate in the West about how much it should get involved in aiding
and protecting former Soviet countries on Russia's periphery. All of them now
face greater threats of coercion from Moscow. What should the West do to help
them reduce these risks?
The best way for most of Russia’s neighbors to bolster deterrence
against external aggression is to speed political and economic reforms. An
expansion of democratic opportunity is vital to creating citizen loyalty and
national consensus. Western aid that encourages reforms must remain a priority.
There is wide consensus that the three Baltic states—all
prosperous democracies—deserve strong support consistent with their full
membership in NATO and the EU. The elevation of the crisis in Ukraine to the
top of the Western political agenda and the dispatch of a large team of OSCE
observers to Ukraine show that Western security interests do not stop at NATO’s
edge.
Following the popular uprising against the Yanukovych government,
Europeans now view Ukraine as more European and thus, meriting special
priority. The West’s most effective response to Russia’s threat to Ukraine will
be long and multidimensional. To deter further aggression, the West ought to
ratchet up asset seizures and visa bans, especially in Europe where they will
have the most effect. The West ought to sanction every Russian parliamentarian
who voted for Crimea’s annexation. Western governments should not delay in
imposing sanctions on key economic sectors, such as energy, finance, and the
mining and metals industry. Europe and the United States should make clear that
sanctions will increase not only if Russia commits more aggression against
Ukraine, but even as it continues to occupy Crimea.
Russia has repeatedly used its regional dominance in gas and oil
supplies to pressure or punish Ukraine and the Baltic states. To lessen
long-term dependence, the United States should clear the backlog of licensing
applications to export liquefied natural gas to Europe. Market economics will
determine how many export facilities will be built. Europe should bite the
bullet and reduce its energy dependence on Russia.
In terms of military support, NATO has begun to add air
surveillance capabilities in the Baltics; this should move forward briskly and
become permanent. NATO should deploy forces in the Baltics as well as in
Poland. NATO members should respond favorably and quickly to sensible Ukrainian
requests for military support and defensive weapons. The aggression in Crimea
should remove any barriers to NATO forward deployments that may have emerged
from discussions with Russia about expansion of the Alliance. Based on Russia’s
actions in Ukraine, France should cancel its sale of Mistral-class amphibious assault
vessels to Russia. These helicopter carriers are well suited for rapid attack
against neighbors, an evident reason why Russia ordered them after frustrations
in conducting its war with Georgia in 2008.
Most of Russia’s other neighbors will welcome close consultations
with the West regarding Russian threats and capabilities in the region. Popular
support in Western countries for aiding authoritarian governments, however, is
low.
Azerbaijan suffers from dictatorial rule and severe corruption,
but it is an important energy supplier to Europe. Azerbaijan and Armenia have
strategic locations adjacent to Iran. Armenia enjoys strong support from its
diaspora in the West. As an energy transit country and an emerging democracy,
Georgia remains important to the West. Georgia participates with enthusiasm in
programs with NATO and the EU Eastern Partnership.
Central Asia generally has lower priority in the West because of
geography. More important, excepting some democratic development in Kyrgyzstan,
Central Asia is burdened by dictatorial rule. Central Asia and Azerbaijan will
try to use Russia’s threat as a hook to keep the West involved in regional
security after NATO draws down troops in Afghanistan, and to spur the West to
suppress its appetite for criticizing human rights abuses and political
repression.
In Crimea, Russia has violated the widely accepted international
norm of not seizing and annexing territory by force. This is also relevant to
the purposes of the Minsk Group (co-chaired by France, Russia, and the US),
which spearheads the OSCE’s thus far unsuccessful efforts to find a peaceful
solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Minsk Group has opposed
referenda on the status of the separatist region.
The Information Space
Russian state television, widely watched in the former Soviet
space, because it features better-quality entertainment programs than local
stations, dishes out virulently anti-Western propaganda, even more so than in
Soviet times. This helps to shape popular views. To counter this, the West
should also step up broadcast- and Internet-based informational programming.
The post-Soviet generation that grew up, was educated, and started
work after the Soviet collapse in 1991 has no interest in joining the
backward-looking Russia that Putin dreams of restoring. The West should give
much higher preference to programs that introduce young leaders from the region
to the West. As thousands of Fulbright and Rhodes scholars have shown, what
counts is not only the formal education foreign students obtain, but the
life-long change in mental outlook that comes from sharing ideas with young
Westerners in democratic settings.
Conclusion
Russia is no longer a normal country in the international system.
The West must sanction it, but will still benefit from cooperation on such
issues as nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea. Moscow will likely
become less cooperative, yet it has a strategic interest in working with the
West to reduce threats that could boomerang against Russia, such as Islamist
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Western assistance to Russia’s neighbors should seek specially to
counter the creeping annexation tactics that Moscow is employing in eastern
Ukraine, using paid provocateurs and seizure of key facilities. Interestingly,
these actions have not led to local popular rebellions against Ukrainian rule.
We are now in a different world. The West must strongly support
Ukraine even as it presses for reforms.
Ian Bond was British ambassador to Latvia. Brian Carlson was US
ambassador to Latvia. Denis Corboy was EU ambassador to Armenia and Georgia.
William Courtney was US ambassador to Georgia and Kazakhstan. John Herbst was
US ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Richard Kauzlarich was US ambassador
to Azerbaijan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ints Silins was US ambassador to
Latvia. William Taylor was US ambassador to Ukraine. Kenneth Yalowitz was US
ambassador to Belarus and Georgia.
